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AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE IN SETTING THE COST
OF CAPITAL TO THE U.S. DOMESTIC AIRLINES
RICHARD D. GRITTA*
INTRODUCTION
N DETERMINING the reasonableness of overall fare levels to
the domestic airlines, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
must first estimate future total costs. The total required return
allowed by the Board, from which fare levels are derived, is the
sum of normal operating expenses, taxes, and a return to capital
on the rate base (the book value of assets less accumulated depreci-
ation), the cost of funds supplied to the carriers. An approximation
of the latter, referred to as the cost of capital, is difficult.' Unlike
other cost components, which are objectively determinable, this
cost entails serious estimation problems.
The purpose of this article is to survey the CAB's approach to
specifying the cost of capital and to point out an important un-
resolved problem associated with its estimation for the ten domestic
trunklines. That problem concerns the appropriate capital struc-
ture for the industry.
THE COST OF CAPITAL
In theory, the cost of capital under regulation has been defined
as "a percentage ratio which when applied to a rate base, yields the
fair return in dollars which amounts utilities are generally entitled
to earn." It includes interest requirements on debt, dividends on
* Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Santa Clara. BBA, University
of Notre Dame, 1965; MBA, Indiana University, 1967; DBA, University of
Maryland, 1971.
'Its specification, however, is critically important to the carriers' financial
condition. If investors are not permitted to earn their fair rate of return, or if
this return is misspecified, the carriers will experience difficulty in attracting cap-
ital in the future.
ICAB DocKET No. 21866-8 (Aug.-1970) at 1, [hereinafter cited as Do-
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stock, and a return to retained earnings. In practice, this cost is
usually determined as the weighted average of the costs of the
various sources of funds, debt and equity, weighted according to
the proportion of these sources of funds in the industry's capital
structure. That is,3
Cost (in percent) X Weight - Weighted Cost
cost of debt X debt/total capital -
cost of equity X equity/total capital _
cost of capital
Total capital is the sum of long-term debt and equity, and the costs
of debt and equity are the after-tax costs of these funds.'
In 1971, at the conclusion of Phase 8 of the Domestic Passenger
Fare Investigation,' the CAB set the cost of capital to the ten do-
mestic carriers at 12.0 per cent. Using the above methodology, the
cost was determined as,'
Cost X Weight - Weighted Cost
6.20% X .45 - 2.79
16.75% X .55 = 9.21
12.00%
based on estimates of the costs of debt and equity of 6.2 per cent
and 16.75 per cent, respectively.' This 12.0 per cent represented an
increase from the 10.5 per cent set in the 1960 Domestic Passenger
Fare Investigation.8 Central in this new formulation, however, were
the weights assigned to debt and equity. Historically, such weights
had always been generated from the actual book values of debt
MESTIC PASSENGER FARE INVESTIGATION]. Testimony of David A. Kosh before the
CAB in the domestic passenger fare investigation.
8 For a complete discussion of the theory of the cost of capital, see R. JOHN-
SON, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ch. 11 (4th ed. 1971).
' The cost of capital of debt is the embedded (historical) interest cost, ad-
justed for future conditions. The cost of equity, the rate of return expected by
common stockholders, is usually defined as the dividend yield on stock plus the
expected growth in dividends on that stock. It is often estimated in practice by
the earnings yield (earnings/price ratio). For example definitions and the various
techniques used to approximate the costs of debt and equity in 1971, see DO-
MESTIC PASSENGER FARE INVESTGATION at 13-23. Testimony of David A. Kosh.
5 DOMESTIC PASSENGER FARE INVESTIGATION at 1. Testimony of Whitney





and equity on the carriers' balance sheets.! In 1971, however, for
the first time in a major regulatory proceeding, hypothetical or
"optimal" weights (45/55) were employed in the calculation (ver-
sus the actual book value capital structure proportions in 1971 of 60
per cent debt, 40 per cent equity). The "optimal" weights reflected
the CAB's judgment as to the proper capital structure for the ten.
The greater weight placed on equity, the more expensive source of
funds, via the application of the "optimal" structure (55 per cent
in equity versus the actual of 40.0 per cent) was the major factor
in the increase to 12.0 per cent in the cost of capital."
In shifting from precedent, the Board argued that the industry
was overburdened with debt and that sound public policy dictated
that capital structures be more conservative." It hoped that the use
of the hypothetical capital structure would assist in this goal. But
while the CAB's position was a step in the right direction, it can
be argued that the Board did not go far enough in setting the
"optimal" structure at 45/55. This author feels the true "optimal"
is well below the 45 per cent debt ratio, as will be shown below.
THE OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE
The optimal capital structure for any firm or industry is a the-
oretical concept conditioned on the total risk complexion of that
firm or industry. Analysts have identified several levels of risk as
relevant to capital structure considerations. These are business or
operating risk, financial risk, and combined (total) risk. Business
9Id. at 4-14.
10 This is not to suggest that the specification of the costs of debt and equity
are not important. They are highly important, but expert witnesses in Phase 8
on the rate of return differed little in their final estimates of these costs. The
major debate was over the capital structure for the industry. Kosh argued for
costs of 6.5 per cent for debt and 18.0 per cent for equity. Victor Brown set
the costs at 5.7 per cent and 16.0 per cent respectively, and Rhoades Foster
argued for 7.0 per cent and 17 per cent. Id. at 14-32.
" Whitney Gillilland, the CAB Examiner, overruled a preliminary finding
holding for the actual capital structure as of mid-1970. He argued, "In our judge-
ment, the use of the actual capital structure for purposes of determining the
overall rate of return will constitute a substantial obstacle in the way of any
real improvement in the carriers' debt/equity ratios within a reasonable time
frame." Id. at 9.
1" R. JOHNSON, FINANCIL MANAGEMENT chs. 3, 10 (4th ed. 1971).
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risk stems from the intrinsic nature of the industry; that is, its cost
structure, vulnerability to economic cycles, levels of competition,
etc. It results in instability in revenues and operating profits. Finan-
cial risk, on the other hand, is caused by the use of debt finance,
with its obligation to cover fixed charges. The use of debt magnifies
changes in operating profits into more unstable after-tax earnings
and rates of return. Finally, combined risk measures the total effects
of both of the former.
Table I is a summary of various risk measures for the ten airlines
plus data on a group of 35 electric firms, 7 gas, 74 industrials, and
3 telephone companies for comparative purposes. The operating
ratio (operating revenues/operating expenses), a key statistic in
public utility economics, is used as a proxy for business risk. The
higher and the more unstable that ratio, the lower and more vola-
tile will be operating profits.13 Two popular financial ratios, the
Moody's debt ratio (long-term debt/total capital) and the interest
coverage ratio, are traditional measures of financial risk. As with
business risk, high ratios indicate greater risk exposure. Standard
& Poor's Stability Index (SI) supplements the operating ratio as
a measure of business risk and is useful as an index of combined
risk. The study period 1961-69 covers the time frame surveyed by
the CAB in setting the 12.0 per cent return in 1971. 1973 data
are provided as an update.
In setting a sound capital structure for any industry, a proper
combination of risks is essential. Generally, firms or industries high
in one level of risk opt for lower levels of the other. A trade-off
which balances total risk is a prerequisite to financial health. Add-
ing high levels of financial risk onto high levels of business risk, for
example, serves only to intensify the variability in after-tax returns
to common stockholders, a very undesirable situation.' Table I
shows evidence of the attempted balance in the case of the samples
of industrials, gas, electric, and telephone companies. Their con-
" Kosh provides a direct measure to link the operating ratio to variability
in operating profits. See DOMESTIC PASSENGER FARE INVESTIGATION. For the im-
portance of the operating ratio as a measure of business risk in air transport,
see J. FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION at 331-32 (4th ed. 1961).
1" Business and financial risk interact multiplicatively, much like levers in
physics. Stockholders are, of course, adverse to unstable rates of return. R. JOHN-
SON, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT Ch. 10 (4th ed. 1971).
COST OF CAPITAL
trast to the ten airlines is noteworthy. The following summary,




Airlines (10 firms) High High High-Unbalanced
Electrics (35 firms) Low High Moderate-Balanced
Gas (7 firms) Low High Moderate-Balanced
Industrials (74 firms) High Low Moderate-Balanced
Telephones (3 firms) Low High Moderate-Balanced
Of the five major groupings, the airlines and industrials stand out
as sharply higher in business risk. The two have significantly higher
operating ratios, (mean ratios for 1961-73 are 95.0 for the air-
lines and 93.9 for the industrials), and the ratios for the ten car-
riers are particularly unstable (ranging from 91.7 to 99.5). Com-
pare these ratios to those of the electric (77.9), gas (85.6), and
telephone companies (82.8). The SI confirms the greater insta-
bility facing the former two groups, (for the 1961-73 period, 16.2
for the airlines and 10.2 for the industrials), versus the more stable
electric (5.0), gas (2.5), and telephone (3.8) groupings."
At the financial risk level, however, the situation is reversed for
all the samples but the airlines. The groups low in business risk
have much higher debt ratios, (in 1973: 50.8 per cent for the
electrics, 51.0 per cent for the gas companies, and 48.8 per cent
for the telephones), and therefore lower interest coverage ratios
(averaging 5.88, 4.78, and 5.11 respectively), than does the in-
dustrial group (with a debt ratio of 20.5 per cent in 1973 and an
average coverage ratio of 32.88 for the 1961-73 period) as ex-
pected." But the carriers, though similar in business risk to the
industrials, evidence debt burdens as large as those of the groups
far lower in business risk. The ten thus stand as the only group high
in both levels of risk and therefore as the only group high in com-
bined or total risk."
1 The excellent operating ratios of the latter three groups, and their stability
in revenues, are directly related to the stability of demand for their products and
the lack of competitive conditions in their industries (they are natural monopo-
lies). The airlines and industrials unfortunately do not enjoy such advantages.
16 Being natural monopolies facing stable markets for their output, the gas,
electric, and telephone firms can afford more debt finance.
17 The high debt ratios are the result of the carriers' excessive dependence on
long-term debt over the past decade. For a full discussion, see Gritta, Debt Fi-
nance and Volatility in Rates of Return, TRANSPORTATION L.J. 73 (1974).
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The net result of the high combined risk to the airlines is evident
directly from the magnitude of the carriers' SI in rates of returns on
equity, the measure of combined risk. The carriers' SI (86.6) is
significantly higher than those of the industrials (22.4), electrics
(5.7), gas (6.2), and telephone companies (6.8). The evidence
demonstrates that a good deal of the incremental variability be-
tween the carriers and the industrials is due to the high debt loads
of the former.
To achieve the total balance evidenced by the industrials, the
carriers' debt burdens should therefore be markedly lower than the
actual (50.0 per cent in 1973) and the hypothetical (45 per cent)
set in 1971 by the CAB. If the ten are approximately the equal
of the industrials in business risk, then the airlines' debt ratios
should tend more to approach those of the industrials (20.5 per
cent) than those of the telephones (48.8 per cent), gas (51.0 per
cent), or electrics (50.8 per cent). While an exact figure for the
"optimal" debt-to-equity ratio cannot be derived directly from the
above comparisons on the exhibit, an estimate of 30-40 per cent
for debt would seem reasonable. Testimony by one expert witness
in the 1971 investigation has supported this range as "optimal" for
the ten.18
THE EFFECT OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE ON THE COST OF CAPITAL
Considering the "optimal" capital structure to lie in the 30-40
per cent range, the following summarizes the estimation of the cost
of capital for three possible structures, given the cost of debt (6.2
per cent) and equity (16.75 per cent) used by the CAB."
Cost X Weight Weighted Cost
debt 6.20% X .30 = 1.86%
equity 16.75% X .70 11.73%
13.69%
6.20% X .35 2.17%
16.75% X .65 10.89%
13.06%
18 Kosh, however, based his estimates largely on optimal interest coverage
ratios rather than on comparative capital structures. See DOMESTIC PASSENGER
FARE INVESTIGATIONS at 25-26. Exhibits of David A. Kosh.
"It might be argued here that should a lower debt/equity ratio be assumed
as "optimal," it would be necessary to adjust downward the costs of both debt
COST OF CAPITAL
6.20% X .40 - 2.48%
16.75% X .60 10.05%
12.53%
The lowest estimate above exceeds the 12.0 per cent set in 1971 by
over 0.5 per cent. The highest represents 1.7 per cent greater than
that current allowed by the Board. Neither is insignificant when
considered with the overall rate base of the ten in 1973-74 (total
assets were approximately $13.0 billion).
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence strongly suggests that the CAB has understated
the cost of capital, a key input into total costs to the ten carriers,
by failing to specify correctly the "optimal" capital structure for
the industry. The data clearly show the ten to be similar to the
sample of 74 industrial firms in business risk and therefore to be
significantly overleveraged, given the actual debt load (50.0 per cent
in 1973) or the hypothetical (45 per cent) set by the CAB in
1971. The direct result of this has been to deny the airlines returns
adequate enough to promote reasonable profits, thus injuring their
ability to attract new capital."
A balance of total risk is essential in a regulated industry."1 If
and equity as the failure to do so would result in "windfall" profits to the car-
riers. Two counter arguments can be advanced, however. First, the 16.2 per cent
set in 1971 was an underestimate of the cost of equity. The CAB placed heavy
weight on the testimony of Victor Brown. Brown, based on a comparative study
of industrial sub-samples, estimated the cost of equity to be 16.0 per cent. His
data, however, actually suggests that the true cost of equity capital to the air-
lines was closer to 18.0 per cent. Brown mysteriously excluded the most com-
parative of his sub-samples in his final estimates, thus biasing his estimate down-
ward. See DOMESTIC PASSENGER FARE INVESTIGATION. Testimony and exhibits of
Victor H. Brown. Second, the costs of both debt and equity have risen in mid-
1974. Average airline earnings price ratios, often used as estimators of the cost
of equity capital, were in the 18-20 per cent range, and the cost of new debt
had risen steeply as the Federal Reserve tightened the money supply. Yields on
some airline debt were in the 10-12 per cent range. Adjusted for taxes, these
yields are far higher than the 6.2 per cent after-tax cost used by the CAB in
1971.
20 While virtually all stocks slid sharply in 1974, the airlines as a group have
been depressed for several years. This is the direct result of investor apathy to
securities whose returns are far too low in comparison with other groups equal
in total risk.
21 Increasing the allowable return is necessary now to restore profitability to
the carriers. As economic conditions improve, and especially as actual debt/equity
ratios decrease into more normal ranges, however, the CAB might intervene to
readjust the cost of capital downward. The CAB in the past seems to have fol-
1975]
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the CAB is to meet its mandate to "foster sound financial conditions
in air transportation," it must recognize the need for this balance
in setting the cost of capital to the carriers. '
lowed a "fire-fighting" approach to airlines' financial problems, convening major
investigations only in response to crises. This author believes the Board would
be more effective in fostering sound conditions within the industry if it continu-
ously monitored the cost of capital, adjusting it as conditions demanded. Even
a two or three year review would seem superior to the current approach.
22 It must be noted here that increasing the allowable return does not neces-
sarily imply higher fare levels. This author views a change in CAB competitive
policies as the superior strategy aimed at boosting rates of return. An overall
reduced level of competition would accomplish this end result far better than
fare increases, which might only serve to hinder new traffic generation.
